being measures, covering many countries and years, are widely available. Of course there are limitations to such data, so the question of how fruitful the approach is will typically depend on the context. In this paper we discuss some uses of well-being data for central banks.
Before continuing it is worth pointing out that there are (at least) two different broad interpretations of well-being data. To economists trained to focus on utility, the natural interpretation is that well-being data are a proxy for utility. Indeed, this is the interpretation we follow in this paper. On the other hand, to a psychologist who is trained to focus on a multiplicity of emotions, the data are likely to refer to specific positive emotions that are relevant to particular aspects of human existence, with no particular connection to an overall assessment of welfare such as utility.
1 Note that economists have suggested an approach which allows individuals to experience many different mental states (regret, anxiety, excitement, and so on) and relate them to a person's summary measure of utility (for discussions, see Elster and Loewenstein 1992; Caplin and Leahy 2004) . In this study we focus on proxies for contentment, but note that these measures are just one possible instrument for central banks to use if interested in evaluating policy alternatives without the restrictions arising when welfare can only be evaluated through revealed preference.
The main objective of this study is to illustrate how direct data on emotions-in particular, data on contentment-can be used by central banks. The basic exercise involves the inflation-unemployment tradeoff, a ratio that is important in several macroeconomic models. Of course, a reasonable position is also to question several of the assumptions made in these models, so that a second focus of the paper is to use contentment data to explore the validity of these assumptions. For example, one could question the assumption that people care exclusively about money (and leisure).
2 Beyond its lack of plausibility, such an assumption forces economists to translate complex effects of changes in prices and business fluctuations into a monetary value. Or one could also question the standard assumption in macroeconomic models that consider the existence of only one type of (representative) agent. A third and final application where contentment data might be helpful is to verify some broad channels through which inflation is assumed to affect welfare.
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In section 1 we introduce the larger issues by briefly describing the literature on the costs of macroeconomic fluctuations and the literature suggesting that well-being data can be interpreted as capturing (at least some component of) utility.
In section 2 we present the main exercise, which estimates the correlation between contentment and two basic macroeconomic variables, inflation and unemployment. In particular, we focus on data pertaining to overall satisfaction with life as our measure of positive emotions. Under some assumptions, the coefficients can be used to get one estimate of the welfare costs of inflation relative to those of unemployment. This simple exercise yields a different set of estimates than those typically used by economists analyzing the conduct of monetary policy (for example, see the numerical analysis in Woodford 2001 , which draws on Rotemberg and Woodford 1997 ). This section discusses some possible interpretations of the basic results, both in terms of a narrow reading of the previous literature and the role played by behavioral channels. Section 2 also discusses some limitations that arise because we are unsure about the intertemporal nature of contentment data. Finally, it includes a discussion of the appropriate interpretation of our results when contentment is viewed as just one of the emotions that make up utility.
In section 3, we discuss some ways contentment data may be used to construct tests useful to those interested in understanding the channels through which macroeconomic fluctuations matter, including the available evidence on nonlinearities and adaptation. Section 4 explores the question of which emotion a central bank should target. Section 5 concludes.
Some Theory and Well-Being Data

Theoretical Costs of Macroeconomic Fluctuations
Economists have emphasized two important costs of inflation. First, inflation induces people to spend time and mental energy to save on holding money rather than on more productive uses. Second, when price adjustments are staggered, inflation induces spurious volatility in the prices some firms charge relative to others, reducing the price system's ability to allocate resources efficiently. 3 The first problem is typically seen as small (see, for example, Bailey 1956 , Friedman 1969 , and Lucas 2000 so this channel is unlikely to justify the observed preoccupation with keeping inflation low. The efforts to derive high costs of inflation are more successful in the approach followed by Bénabou and Gertner (1993) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) , who focus on the second channel.
A similarly mixed picture emerges with respect to the costs of unemployment. Indeed, in spite of a long tradition studying aggregate economic fluctuations, there is disagreement among economists about the seriousness of their effects. In neoclassical economics, the welfare costs of recessions arise from the lost output that occurs when actual output falls below potential output. The welfare cost can be approximated by the area of a Harberger triangle, which is proportional to the square of the size of the gap. This approach is sometimes adopted by real business cycle theorists, who assume that individuals are optimizing and that recessions are desirable adjustments to productivity shocks. This means that the costs of business cycles are small-perhaps only 0.1 percent of total consumption in the United States. 4 Even when market imperfections are introduced, the costs rise only by a factor of five, and these are significantly lower if borrowing is allowed. As downturns typically follow booms, business cycles do not affect the average level of economic activity. Consequently, these economists have turned their attention to economic growth and away from fluctuations (see Lucas 2003 for a discussion).
Given that one common approach to cooling down an overheated economy is to raise interest rates, which might increase the unemployment rate, there has been particular interest in deriving the welfare losses that arise from changes in the unemployment rate and the inflation rate in the same model so as to be able to compare these losses. 5 This difficult task was undertaken by Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) , who develop a model where structural relations are grounded in optimizing individual behavior and where firms must occasionally keep their prices fixed, resulting in substantial relative price distortions when inflation increases (more on this below). 6 As discussed in Woodford (2001) , their estimates for the United States imply a value for the costs of inflation relative to the output gap of the order of 20 times, when the gap is measured in percentage points and infl ation is measured at an annualized percentage rate. That is, in terms of social welfare the weight on infl ation is 20 times the weight on the output gap.
7 This is a much higher emphasis on infl ation than in the literature on evaluating monetary policy, which often gives equal weight to infl ation and output as stabilization objectives (for examples of such discussions, see Rudebusch and Svensson 1999; and Williams 2003) . As Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) explain, one advantage of their approach is that:
Demanding that one's structural relations be derived from individual optimization also has the advantage that evidence from other sources about the nature of the problems that individuals face can be used to corroborate the quantitative specifi cations that are used to explain the relations among aggregate time series. Ultimately, this is the only way in which the "observational equivalence" of a multitude of alternative possible structural interpretations of the co-movements of aggregate series can be resolved (298).
Answers to direct questions about why infl ation matters are one natural source to draw upon when studying the nature of the problems that individuals face.
8 Interestingly, such answers point toward a completely different source of diffi culties when infl ation rises from those typically assumed in the economists' models. The survey evidence presented in Shiller (1997) , for example, shows that when asked directly about infl ation, individuals report a number of unconventional costs like exploitation, national prestige, or loss of morale. It is likely that the confusion with prices when infl ation picks up makes the status quo in the income distribution harder to justify. For example, if relative price oscillations make speculation more profi table, then people will fi nd it hard to claim that effort pays. This change in beliefs will particularly affect right-wingers (left-wingers already believe that luck, rather than effort, determines income).
Rotemberg (in this volume) discusses a range of evidence supporting the idea that there are behavioral costs of infl ation related to factors like an individual's price knowledge and awareness, paying too much attention when facing a menu of price choices, and regret and anger about price changes. However, we have only a few models to interpret these empirical fi ndings, with the exception of Rotemberg (2005) and, perhaps, adaptation of work in labor economics on the fair wage hypothesis (see Akerlof and Yellen 1990) . Research on these issues seems to be in its infancy, despite the enormous interest in behavioral economics and the central role of prices in the economics profession.
Similarly, there seems to be enormous potential for behavioral economics to improve our understanding of the potential costs of recessions. Substantial work in psychology and sociology indicate that there are emotional costs exacted upon those who lose their jobs that far exceed the monetary costs (see, for example, Clark and Oswald 1994; Winkelmann and Winkelmann 1998; Helliwell 2003; Blanchflower and Oswald 2004) . This large loss is broadly comparable across many countries (see Di Tella, MacCulloch, and Oswald 2003) . And there may be emotional costs from knowing that fellow humans are experiencing low utility, perhaps amplified by beliefs concerning the source of unemployment (for example, those who believe that unemployment follows from a lack of effort versus those who believe it follows from bad luck).
9 Given that such beliefs differ across countries (for example, Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote 2001 report that 60 percent of Americans-yet only 26 percent of Europeans-believe the poor are lazy as opposed to unlucky) the "costs" of unemployment will also differ. These differences will have consequences both for the "correct" response to inflation shocks (see the discussion in section 4) and to unemployment shocks in terms of the optimal amount of unemployment insurance (see, for example, Di Tella and MacCulloch 2006a).
Importantly, it seems that we are still quite far away from having estimates of the costs of inflation that are potentially useful in formulating monetary policy, both because there is little behavior-based research and because there is no easy way of deciding which of the many psychological costs that are theoretically plausible exist in practice, or what weight to give each one of them when an aggregate measure of welfare is derived.
Note that a behavior-based approach also introduces the difficulty that people often mispredict utility (Gilbert et al. 1998) . If this is a generalized phenomenon, calculating the welfare costs of particular events properly is going to be extremely difficult, in part because taking a position on whether there is a "right to be wrong" is controversial (for a discussion, see Oderberg 2000) .
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Data on Positive Emotions and the Connection to Utility
The direct questions about inflation that Shiller (1997) used are subject to potential criticisms. Diamond and Hausman (1994) , for example, worry about strategic manipulation of the answers in contingent valuation studies of environmental costs that use a similar style of questions and believe that a lot depends on the subject's ability to understand difficult issues (such as the workings of the economy or the state of the environment). An alternative to that approach is to ask subjects about a particular emotion-for example, how happy or satisfied they feel with their life-and then correlate the answers with the variables of interest (in our case, inflation and unemployment). This imposes fewer informational demands, as presumably it is easier to know how one feels than how the economy works.
10
A natural reaction to data on well-being (and other emotions) is to dismiss them as hopelessly noisy. Thus, a first task for the approach we present is to establish some connection between the answers to happiness questionnaires and true utility. The general strategy used by researchers in the field is to correlate happiness and life satisfaction scores with some variable that we can plausibly claim is associated with what an economist would call "true utility." Note that, traditionally, it has been quite hard to discern true utility accurately. For example, presumably the act of smiling reflects some positive emotion. Yet in some situations and cultures smiling occurs in settings that do not appear to involve high enjoyment or utility. In one famous experiment in psychology, Landis (1924) photographed students while they listened to music, looked at pornographic material, smelled ammonia or observed him decapitate a live rat. Third-party observers were unable to predict the activity by looking at the photographs.
However, more recent research shows that this inability results from a failure to distinguish between different types of smiles. Researchers in this field, particularly Paul Ekman, emphasize the distinction between the smile which mainly reveals teeth (the "Pan American smile" named after the famous American airline of the 1960s) and the Duchenne smile, a type of smiling that involves a muscle near the eye (called orbicularis oculi, pars laterali) which can indeed capture true enjoyment. Importantly for us, Duchenne smiles are correlated with self-reported happiness (Ekman, Friesen, and O'Sullivan 1988; Ekman, Davidson and Friesen 1990) . Happiness answers (and Duchenne smiles) are also correlated with left frontal brain activity, which in turn appears to be connected to different forms of what we are calling true utility. Davidson and Fox (1982) , for example, show that 10-month old infants exhibit greater activation of the left frontal than the right frontal area of the brain in response to videotapes of an actress generating happy facial expressions. In contrast, asymmetry in other parts of the brain failed to discriminate between the conditions. See Urry et al. (2004) for more recent evidence on the neural correlates of well-being. Useful starting points in the literature on happiness include Diener et al. (1999) and Veenhoven (1993) , as well as the recent reviews by Di Tella and MacCulloch (2006b) and Clark, Fritjers, and Shields (2008) .
Another argument that has been made to justify a connection between happiness scores and utility is that cross-sectional and panel studies (some of them cited above) reveal that unemployed individuals tend to report low happiness scores. The connection occurs because we think that other adverse life events like divorce, addiction, depression, and violence are correlated with unemployment. Using large samples across many countries, Helliwell (2003) and Deaton (2007) find happiness measures to be positively related to variables that are expected to be associated with high utility like trust and income. Helliwell (2003) and Blanchflower and Oswald (2008) find a positive connection between happiness scores and good health. A related point is that "well-being equations" (where happiness and life satisfaction scores are correlated with the demographic characteristics of the respondents) are broadly similar across countries, an unlikely outcome if the data contained just noise (see, for example, Di Tella, MacCulloch, and Oswald 2003) .
To be sure, there are findings in the literature that do not fit our standard economic models, including that conjoined twins are relatively happy, or that money doesn't buy happiness in the long run (see, for example, Gilbert 2006 and Easterlin 1974) .
11 Ultimately, happiness research takes the view that happiness and life satisfaction scores are related to true internal utility with some noise, but that the signal-to-noise ratio in the data is sufficiently high to make empirical research productive.
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Contentment and Macroeconomic Fluctuations
The Contentment Costs of Inflation and Unemployment: Basic Estimates
Once the approach is accepted as potentially fruitful, we run a regression of the form:
where Life Satisfaction ntj is our proxy for a component of utility of individual, j, living in nation, n, in year, t, derived from the survey question that asks, "On the whole, are you satisfied with the life you lead?" The four possible answers are "not at all satisfied," "not very satisfied," "fairly satisfied," and "very satisfied." It comes from the Eurobarometer survey series, it is a repeated cross-section, and this particular question is administered towards the early part of the questionnaire (for more description, see Di Tella, MacCulloch, and Oswald 2003) . Inflation nt is measured by the rate of change in the Consumer Price Index. 12 The expression denoted by Ω ntj is a vector of personal characteristics (for instance, employment status, including the categories of self-employed, retired, keeping home, or in school; income position; marital status; education; city size; gender; age; and age-squared) and potentially other macroeconomic controls (like GDP or hours). The expression γ n denotes country fixed effects and η t are year fixed effects. The error term is μ ntj . The standard economic interpretation (meaning one given by somebody who adheres to the assumption that a representative agent exists, that a summary measure of utility exists, and that agents only care about income) is that equation (1) is a reduced-form of a welfare loss function (whereby inflation and unemployment are assumed to affect utility only through their effect on income and possibly on future income).
Finally, several factors conspire against a full treatment of causality. The first is that this is a study about the left-side variable (an emotion). Thus, even if we use several pages to convince the readers that we have clever instruments, most of them will still be wondering what it is that we are estimating. Second, it is hard to think about instruments when the theoretical literature has done so little to isolate convincing forces that reduce utility when there are macroeconomic fluctuations. Indeed, the most convincing effects involve behavioral costs that have not yet been fully modeled. Thus, specifying what are the omitted variables in equation (1) is a daunting task until macroeconomists produce better models of the costs of macroeconomic fluctuations (see also the discussion of the results in table 5 below). Third, we report some evidence concerning how unemployment arising due to plant closures in Germany is associated with drops in contentment. This evidence, while obviously incomplete for some of our purposes, at least confirms that there is a causal negative effect through which macroeconomic fluctuations affect positive emotions. Finally, we produce some tests that are identified within the context of the Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) model, although we are aware that reasonable people will perhaps see this as too narrow a test.
Column 1 in table 1 presents the results when equation (1) is estimated as an ordered probit and shows that the coefficients on unemployment and inflation are both negative and significant. Column 2 repeats the exercise controlling for country-specific time trends, finding similar results. They are similar to the estimates presented in previous work by Di Oswald (2001, 2003) and Wolfers (2003) .
In order to see the size of the effect, note that a 10 percentage point increase in unemployment reduces average life satisfaction by 0.32 standard deviations. A 10 percentage point increase in inflation reduces average life satisfaction by 0.24 standard deviations. Figure 1 illustrates our results graphically. In the base scenario, the cut points leave 3.9 percent of the population in the lowest life satisfaction category, 12.7 percent in the second-to-last category, 55.5 percent in the next one up, and 27.9 percent in the top category. The first scenario shows that when unemployment increases 10 percentage points, the median person is as satisfied as the person at the 43rd percentile in the base scenario (when unemployment and inflation are at their average level in the sample). And when inflation increases by 10 percentage points, the median person is as satisfied as the person at the 45th percentile in the life satisfaction distribution in the base scenario. In an attempt to provide another metric for these changes, Wolfers (2003) Source: Eurobarometer Survey Series Note: All regressions control for personal characteristics, including employment status (self-employed, retired, keeping house, or in school), income, marital status, education, gender, and age-squared. Ordered probit regressions with robust standard errors appear in parentheses, clustered at the country-year level. The regressions use as dependent variable the answer to the Eurobarometer question, "On the whole, are you satisfied with the life you lead?" The four possible answers are: "not at all satisfied"; "not very satisfied"; "fairly satisfied"; "very satisfied." GDP per capita is real GDP per capita in the country, measured in U.S. dollars. Hours is the average weekly hours worked per capita. unemployment and inflation for the Eurobarometer surveys are 0.035 and 0.045, respectively. Finally, it is worth noting that the 90-percent interval for the ratio of the coefficients on unemployment to inflation is 0.5 to 2.1, which implies a likelihood of more weight on unemployment than on inflation.
We can repeat the exercise with World Values Survey data (see Helliwell 2003) . There are four waves and a larger sample of countries (a total of 145 country-year clusters), and a similar set of demographics available. The contentment data also come from a life satisfaction question, but with answers coded on a 1-10 scale, so that presumably fewer people are restricted by the limited number of categories available in the construction of the answer key (still, the top category has almost 14 percent of the sample). 13 We group the answers into four categories that yield similar proportions to the Eurobarometer sample (although no substantive conclusion depends on this). The coefficient on inflation is 
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Rafael Di Tella and Robert MacCulloch negative and signifi cant, whereas that on unemployment is positive and marginally signifi cant. The sample includes former socialist countries. When the infl ation and unemployment coeffi cients are allowed to take a different value in the former socialist countries, the coeffi cient on infl ation becomes more negative (almost three times in absolute value) and more precisely estimated, while that on unemployment becomes negative (but insignifi cant). Given that the sample includes countries with very unequal characteristics (different levels of income, of informal family insurance, and so on), it might be advisable to include the log of GDP as a control, which yields similar results. The standard deviations of unemployment and infl ation for the World Values surveys are 0.06 and 1.00, respectively. Given this, once the actual variation in infl ation is taken into account, the size of the infl ation coeffi cient is comparable to the coefficient in equation (1).
In the European sample the estimate that a percentage point of unemployment causes at least as much discontent as a percentage point of infl ation seems robust, although the precise multiple varies in different studies.
14 Note that the coeffi cient on the unemployment rate in table 1 refl ects how the average person changes their score when unemployment changes. But the average person is not unemployed. Since the contentment regression in table 1 also includes a control variable for whether each person is unemployed (in the set of personal characteristics), the coeffi cient on this variable measures the direct cost to those who become unemployed. Therefore to calculate the total cost of unemployment, the cost must be increased by adding the individual cost to the unemployed.
A Narrow View: Aggregating All Social Costs of Infl ation and Unemployment
Adding up the total costs of infl ation and unemployment (as outlined in section 1) can be quite diffi cult, especially when we know so little about them (particularly the psychic costs suggested by behavioral economics). One can take a narrow view and take the models developed in the previous literature literally. For example, consider the fi rst paper to derive a social loss function with both infl ation and the output gap, Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) . 15 They start by assuming a utility function with both consumption and leisure as explanatory variables.
Firms only occasionally get a chance to change their prices and staggered price adjustments lead to oscillations in relative prices. There are two costs of inflation. On the one hand, such oscillations result in direct misallocation of resources, reducing income (consumption). And because there are diminishing returns, the volatility in production means that productivity falls (so more labor input, meaning less leisure, is needed for the same output). This means that if we estimate a social loss function on the output gap (or unemployment) with the hope of capturing the costs of lower consumption, we are missing out on the possibility that sometimes the same level of consumption requires more labor input (due to higher inflation). Thus, the social loss function has the output gap and hours (or inflation) as arguments. A narrow prediction of this model is that, controlling for the output gap (proxied by the unemployment rate) and leisure (proxied by average weekly hours worked), inflation should have no effect on an instantaneous measure of welfare. A test of this is presented in columns 3 and 4 in table 1. It seems that inflation matters to people, even after controlling for the channels that are assumed in the Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) model.
Of course, one can take the plausible position that contentment somehow captures, at least in part, the future. In this case, inflation may enter because it is capturing future values of leisure. One could see if this is indeed the case by checking if future leisure is really predicted by inflation today, once current leisure, income, and unemployment are included (it is not). But perhaps the main point we are making is that simple tests relevant to central banks can be constructed with these data.
In brief, a narrow reading of the literature suggests that with several assumptions-including that a summary measure of utility exists, all channels through which inflation and unemployment matter can be reduced to consumption and leisure, and there is a representative agentthe social welfare loss function can be written as:
Conditional on accepting these assumptions, the coefficients in equation (1) provide a way to aggregate all of the relevant costs and benefits of macroeconomic fluctuations. In this view, the regression patterns detected in equation (1) turn out-unknown to the respondents completing their contentment score sheets-to trace out a welfare loss function defined over inflation and unemployment as described in equation (2).
It is tempting to claim that, even when people mispredict utility (as in Gilbert et al. 1998 ) the coefficients in equation (1) adequately capture the costs of inflation and unemployment. Although it is possible that they capture all instantaneous costs, there is still the problem that macrofluctuations may affect planning, and hence future utility (and that these costs only register at a later date).
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Cardinal Interpretation
One straightforward interpretation of the coefficients is that they reveal that individuals find inflation and unemployment costly. This conclusion involves comparing contentment scores of different people and at different points in time. Reliance on the interpersonal comparability of contentment scores, however, is nonstandard for economists. As Hammond (1991) puts it:
Following [Lionel] Robbins, it became fashionable for economists to eschew ICUs [interpersonal comparisons of utility], apparently in an attempt to be scientific. … And where interpersonal comparisons really have to be made, because the gainers from a change were not going to compensate the losers, the monetary comparisons that result from valuing all individuals' dollars equally still seem to be the most popular among economists, who then wonder why their policy advice does not receive wider acceptance (206).
One possibility is to follow standard practice in macroeconomics and assume that a representative agent exists, with the contentment measures as repeated attempts at getting a reading of his/her utility. Staying with this assumption would be convenient given that it is obviously quite difficult to interpret differences in contentment scores between just two individuals.
17 Consider the question of the importance of income, and the finding that contentment is positively correlated with income in the cross-section. Since energetic/optimistic people tend to work hard (earning high income) and also tend to see the bright side of things, it is implausible that the error term is uncorrelated with income. Although one could theoretically calculate bounds (where exaggeration needs to fall in order to affect the qualitative conclusions) or even find ways to control for exaggeration (maybe through questions concerning a fixed objective circumstance, as in some vignettes) this problem need not reduce central banks' interest in contentment data. The reason is that several interesting estimates in macroeconomics involve comparing large groups of people. Some of these exercises still require strong assumptions to allow interpretations but others do not. Specifically, in the finding that contentment scores are lower with high inflation, the unit is the country (in a particular year) and it is reasonable to assume that exaggeration and modesty have similar distributions across countries. Importantly, such distribution is unlikely to be correlated with the inflation rate.
Note also that even when cultural differences make the assumption of a similar distribution of "exaggerators" questionable, one could focus on changes over time within countries. Indeed, panel estimates like equation (1) have the advantage of correlating changes in life satisfaction reports with changes in the inflation rate. It is unlikely that countries enter into bouts of collective of exaggeration, disconnected from hedonic fundamentals. Of course, booms have an element of collective euphoria. But this is typically genuine, meaning it is unlikely that it results in large groups of people ticking up their scores even when they themselves are not experiencing higher true utility. It is worth noting that another potential interest of equation (1) is the ratio, α / β. In this particular case, even when temporal swings in exaggeration divorced from hedonic fundamentals do take place, the ratio would be unaffected to the extent that these swings are uncorrelated with macroeconomic performance (and instead with variables like the weather) or are correlated in the same way with both of our indicators of macroeconomic performance (unemployment and inflation).
To test the validity of these assumptions it is possible to estimate regressions separately for different groups. For example, if left-leaning individuals use language differently than right-wingers it might be important to estimate these two groups separately. Conveniently, in the Eurobarometer Survey Series respondents are asked: "In political matters, people talk of 'the left' and 'the right.' How would you place your own views on this scale [from 1 to 10]?" In Di Tella and MacCulloch (2005) , respondents were classified as being "left-wing" if their response was in categories 1 to 3 and as "right-wing" if they answered categories 8 to 10. 18 The main exercise in that paper was to estimate the basic regression in equation (1) separately for the two subsamples. If left-wingers are assumed to use language similarly, and right-wingers are also assumed to use language similarly, the α / β ratio in each regression does not have a problem of interpersonal comparability. A natural alternative is comparing poor and rich groups of individuals.
One prominent application in macroeconomics involves the comparison of the ratio, α / β, across different groups (for instance, left versus right, or poor versus rich), as in Alesina (1987) . The estimation exercise in Di Tella and MacCulloch (2005) is extremely unlikely to be affected by temporal swings in exaggeration that cause some form of measurement error in the contentment data, since these swings would have to be correlated with unemployment and inflation differentially across the two groups in order to affect our results. (See also the discussion in section 3).
Finally, it is worth noting that some of the limitations in these data are not inherent problems with direct measures of utility or its components and that considerable progress could be made if some resources went into designing new measures. For example, Hsee and Tang (2007) have recently proposed asking about happiness in a way that fixes the extreme values at the end of the scales across people (by providing descriptions of the extreme values and intermediate points of reference). Another interesting possibility, particularly for economists, is described by . They discuss how a focus on the proportion of time people spend in an unpleasant emotional state would allow us to construct an index that is based on an ordinal measure of feelings at the episode level that reduces the impact of individual variability in the use of scales. One reason that such a formulation is significant is because it shows that, in principle, it would be possible to derive direct measures of utility or its components without giving up too much in terms of strict assumptions about interpersonal comparability.
Time Horizons: Instantaneous versus Lifetime Effects
For the approach we are discussing, a serious difficulty for applications in macroeconomics is that ambiguity remains concerning the time horizon used by individuals in framing their answers to the life satisfaction question. When researchers have the ability to design the questions, they have opted to capture what economists would call instantaneous utility. have recently argued that well-being measures are best described as "a global retrospective judgment, which in most cases is constructed only when asked and is determined in part by the respondent's current mood and memory, and by the immediate context"(6). They then described the famous dime experiment of Schwarz (1987) , whereby subjects "accidentally" find a dime before filling out a life satisfaction questionnaire. The lucky half of the sample reported substantially higher levels of satisfaction with life.
On the other hand, one would expect that such small shocks can be treated as noise in regression analyses. And we know that contentment data react to other shocks in a way that is consistent with standard economic models. As an illustration, consider the life satisfaction response to two shocks that have been observed to have large impacts upon well-being in cross-sectional studies, namely unemployment (a negative correlation) and retirement (a positive correlation). Using the German Socioeconomic Panel we can follow a sample of West Germans before and after an unanticipated shock (unemployment arising from a plant closure) and the anticipated shock of retirement (see figure 2). As we are using a balanced panel the same people are being surveyed in the period before and after the shock has occurred, which means that some of those people who lost their jobs due to plant closure may subsequently be rehired while others may not. Note the large, but temporary, satisfaction drop associated with the plant closing, in spite of the few long-term problems that are revealed by this shock (which is presumably exogenous to the individual), in a country with a generous system of unemployment insurance and with a relatively low unemployment rate. 19 In comparison, retirement is associated with no detectable changes in life satisfaction.
This ambiguity in time horizon has been a serious problem for applications of contentment data, particularly in macroeconomics. Most researchers have opted for showing high correlations, or repeating their estimates using questions worded slightly differently, and claim robustness (see Oswald 2001, 2003; Wolfers 2003; Blanchflower and Oswald 2004) . Given that this ambiguity seems to be an important weakness for the data presently available, we now provide some preliminary but suggestive evidence bearing on this issue. Our strategy is to exploit the fact that before 1987 most Eurobarometers included (besides the question on life satisfaction described in section 2) a question administered towards the end of the survey: "Taking all things together, how would you say things are these days-would you say you're very happy, fairly happy, or not too happy these days?" (Small "don't know" and "no answer" categories are not studied here.) Let the variable, happiness, be defi ned as follows: 1="not too happy," 2="fairly happy," and 3="very happy." Life satisfaction and happiness are strongly positively correlated (Pearson's correlation coeffi cient equals 0.56). In table 2 we test to see whether the future is also a part of what is being captured in the life satisfaction responses in comparison with the happiness responses by repeating the basic regression using just the sample for which we have both sets of data available and also including the future levels of unemployment and infl ation. Although we have less than half the sample (as happiness data are available up to 1986 only), columns 1 and 2 show that whereas the coeffi cients on future infl ation are similar, future unemployment is uncorrelated with happiness data but strongly correlated with life satisfaction data. The difference between the coeffi cients on the future unemployment rate in these two columns of table 2 is signifi cant at the 5-percent level. One interpretation is that macroeconomic changes matter beyond the moment (perhaps even beyond the next six months) and that life satisfaction, with its reference to "the life you lead" (as opposed to "happy these days") introduces a longer time horizon.
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This ambiguity about the interpretation of these different measures is, perhaps, natural given that they were not developed for macroeconomic applications where intertemporal matters are so important. 21 It does not, however, seem like an insurmountable problem if some energy went into designing questions that can make the distinction. For new measurement strategies see, for example, Kahneman et al. (2004) and Kimball and Willis (2006) .
Although these are relatively new methods (and not yet available across many countries and years), they do remind us that the measurement of emotions in economics is still in its infancy as a research area, and that it is hard to predict how effective this research program will be in the long run, particularly relative to longstanding programs (for example, national accounts) in which economists have convinced society to spend considerable amounts of money. One natural (and cheap) starting point for macroeconomists would be to include two questions, asked in suc- Source: Eurobarometer Survey Series (1973) (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) Note: Ordered probit regressions with robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country year level. Personal characteristics include employment status (self-employed, retired, keeping house, or in school), income, marital status, education, gender, and age-squared. The dependent variable in column (1) is the answer to the Eurobarometer question, "On the whole, are you satisfied with the life you lead?" The four possible answers are: "not at all satisfied"; "not very satisfied"; "fairly satisfied"; "very satisfied". The dependent variable in column 2 is the response to the Eurobarometer question, "Taking all things together, how would you say things are these days-would you say you're very happy, fairly happy, or not too happy these days?" (1 = "not too happy", 2 = "fairly happy" and 3 = "very happy"). Unemployment rate t + 1 and Inflation rate t + 1 are the unemployment and inflation rates one year into the future. cession one after the other, with appropriate differential emphasis on the future and the present. We do not know of any questionnaires available at present designed to deal effectively with this problem across countries and years.
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Contentment versus Other Emotions
As fi rst mentioned in the introduction, there is the possibility that contentment is just one of the components of utility. For illustration purposes, assume that only contentment and regret make up utility. In that case, we have:
where ` > 0 and we normalize the coeffi cient on contentment to equal 1. Assume also that we are interested in estimating:
(4) Utility = −A Unemployment − B Infl ation + m, which implies that:
where A > 0 and B > 0. We maintain the assumption that shocks to infl ation and unemployment are uncorrelated with m. Now assume that we try to estimate the following regression equation (mistakenly believing that life satisfaction scores, which measure contentment, are also a good proxy for utility):
Then the error term contains the other elements of what we are calling true utility:
Let the expected values of the point estimates of the coeffi cients on unemployment and infl ation obtained from estimating equation (6) Indeed, in Rotemberg's theory of regret, correlation(ψ, Inflation) > 0, so that when inflation goes up, true utility is going to be falling more than life satisfaction (due to the extra effects of regret).
Of course, this is a simple illustration since the bias is hard to pin down, particularly when other emotions (besides regret) are included. With a multiplicity of emotions, a natural question is whether measures appropriate for empirical analyses can be constructed to produce better tests as outlined above. It seems so. A simple theoretical position, for example, is to view emotional expressions as a basic by-product of emotional experience. 23 If emotional expressions provide a guide for the actual experiences, then the expressions themselves are one indicator of the range of emotions available in humans. A large amount of work in this area is due to Paul Ekman (see, for example, Ekman, Sorenson, and Friesen 1969; Hager and Ekman 1983) . Facial analysis has been facilitated by a method for coding emotions called the Facial Action Coding System (FACS). Figure 3 , adapted from Hager and Ekman (1983) , illustrates this method.
Six different types of facial expressions-happy, sad, angry, fear, disgust, and surprise-appear to be the most robust and are are depicted in figure 4. It seems possible to argue that other emotions can be reduced to versions of these six types, although there is some contention about contempt (which is arguably a version of disgust), shame, and startle. The facial coding system and these faces are described online at http:// face-and-emotion.com/dataface/emotion/expression.jsp.
Other Contentment Tests in Macroeconomics
Further tests can be informative. First, a natural step is to move beyond the representative agent paradigm and estimate the impact of macroeconomic fluctuations on contentment across groups. This has intrinsic interest (for example, in partisan political economy models) and is also relevant to the discussions in section 2 above (as it is one solution when there are groups that are suspected of using language differently in ways that may affect the estimates in equation (1) in table 1). Second, we can also use contentment data to help identify some of the channels through which macroeconomic fluctuations matter. And finally, it is possible to study how macroeconomic fluctuations matter, in particular whether there is a significant role for nonlinearities. These three kinds of contentment tests are the focus of this section, and we address each one in turn.
There has been some interest among macroeconomists in studying the costs of business cycles for different groups. In some cases, such differences might even explain different views about the optimal response to shocks, and hence, differences in the experience under policymakers of different color (see, for example, Alesina 1987; Hibbs 1987) . One dimension that has received particular interest is income. Hibbs (1987) cites Paul Samuelson as saying:
We tend to get our recessions during Republican administrations. . . .The difference between the Democrats and the Republicans is the difference in their constituencies. It's a class difference. . . .The Democrats constitute the people, by and large, who are around the median incomes or below. These are the ones whom the Republicans want to pay the price and burden of fighting inflation. The Democrats are willing to run some inflation (to increase employment); the Republicans are not (213).
Contentment data can be used to study these questions. Table 3 shows how inflation and unemployment affect life satisfaction responses by demographic groups. In column (1) we present the results for inflation, and note that those on low income display the biggest reductions in life satisfaction. The negative coefficient on inflation is monotonically smaller (in absolute value) as we go up the income quartiles, although the effect is not significant. This is consistent with Di Tella and MacCulloch (2005) . It is also quite intriguing that the employed (the omitted category) are significantly more adversely affected by inflation compared to the selfemployed and those who stay "at home." Males are less affected by inflation than females. Those with little education (less than 15 years, the base category) are more affected by inflation than those with high levels (more than 18 years) and, in particular, those with intermediate levels of education (between 15 and 18 years). There are fewer detectable changes in the basic patterns in column 2, which studies the effect of unemployment across the different groups. The biggest effects are that recessions are particularly costly in contentment terms to those coming of age (see also Bechetti, Castriota, and Giuntella 2007) and those with intermediate and high levels of education. An alternative approach is to focus on different partisan political beliefs. In several estimates based on contentment regressions, we found weaker differences between these groups than those found in Di Tella and MacCulloch (2005) , which focuses on a smaller sample of countries and years (up to 1992) and finds that the unemployment/inflation ratio is higher for left-wingers than for right-wingers.
A second possible use of contentment data is to test the relevance of some of the channels suggested in the theoretical literature. For example, in all of the papers in the literature that we know, being unemployed is associated with large emotional costs, even after controlling for the income losses associated with losing a job (see, for example, Clark and Oswald 1994). The coefficients typically imply very large costs, approximately similar to the well-being difference reported by individuals at the opposite ends of the income distribution in the sample. Assuming these estimates reflect causal forces, they reject the approach used by real business cycle theorists to measure the costs of business cycles, if only because jobless but insured individuals would presumably experience smaller downturns in utility. One could still force a classic interpretation by thinking that these are simply people with unrealistic aspirations about what jobs they can get. However, Clark (2003) presents panel evidence showing that the drop in well-being associated with becoming unemployed is smaller given the higher the unemployment rate is in this person's reference group (see also Stutzer and Lalive 2004) . 24 Some general information on these channels can be obtained by looking at the effect of unemployment and inflation across different groups in table 3. Column 2 finds that the coefficient on being unemployed becomes more negative at higher unemployment rates, although it is imprecisely estimated (and does not use the unemployment rate in the reference group). Di Tella, MacCulloch, and Oswald (2003) test the hypothesis that the welfare state has made life too easy for the unem-ployed. They find a strong, positive relationship between the reported life satisfaction of the unemployed and the generosity of unemployment insurance in panel regressions (see, for example, table 12, column 2 in that paper).
Finally, another possible use of data on emotions is in answering the question of whether nonlinearities exist in the welfare loss function. This is important for answering the question of whether it is more important for the central bank to produce low inflation or stable inflation. Mankiw (2001) notes that "if low average inflation is the goal then the monetary policymakers of the 1990s [in the United States] can be given only an average grade. But if stable inflation is the goal, then they go to the top of the class." He mentions that there is "little direct evidence of convexity in the costs of inflation. As a result, it is hard to compare quantitatively the benefits of low inflation with the benefits of stable inflation" (9-10).
The assumed quadratic welfare loss function is given by
Di Tella, MacCulloch, and Oswald (2001) do not detect nonlinear effects of inflation using life satisfaction surveys. Wolfers (2003) presents a full set of tests for the presence of nonlinearities on both macro variables. He finds that convexities exist with respect to unemployment but are "less easy to detect" with respect to inflation. Consequently his paper finds that "eliminating unemployment volatility would raise well-being by an amount roughly equal to that from lowering the average level of unemployment by a quarter of a percentage point" (1). Table 4 explores the evidence on nonlinearities by extending the basic estimates using squared terms. We find evidence of a nonlinearity with respect to unemployment but not with respect to inflation. However, unlike the Eurobarometer data, no evidence of a nonlinearity with respect to unemployment is found using World Values Survey data, although given the informal nature of the labor market in some of the countries in the (cross-sectionally) larger data set, unemployment may not be the best indicator of the state of the economy.
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Note that nonlinearities could be coming from a quirk in the reporting function. Although we may estimate a life satisfaction regression that appears to be nonlinear in unemployment, this implies that there is a nonlinear relationship between unemployment and true internal utility only given the (sufficient) condition that the mapping between internal utility and an individual's self-reported satisfaction is linear. However, when the mapping, g, is nonlinear,
then the (true) linear relationship between internal utility and unemployment will not be detected in our life satisfaction regression. Evidence on Note: Ordered probit regressions with robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country-year level. Personal characteristics include employment status (self-employed, retired, keeping house, or in school), income, marital status, education, gender, and age-squared. The dependent variable is the answer to the Eurobarometer question, "On the whole, are you satisfied with the life you lead?" The four possible answers are "not at all satisfied"; "not very satisfied"; "fairly satisfied"; "very satisfied." the form of the reporting function is limited and may also pose problems when undertaking interpersonal comparisons of contentment, particularly when there is habituation (see below).
Finally, it is possible to use the data to explore the question of adaptation to high infl ation and high unemployment. We test for the presence of these effects by including a lagged term. Then we can calculate the long-term effect of a shock in, say, unemployment, by adding the current and lagged coeffi cients. Table 5 illustrates and fi nds adaptation to unemployment while little adaptation to infl ation. The long-run coeffi cient on unemployment is only 34 percent of the short-run estimate {0.34=(−4.4+2.9)/−4.4}. One complication in the interpretation of these effects is that the issue of causality becomes particularly relevant. Indeed, positive theories of infl ation predict that central banks may be more tempted to infl ate to reduce unemployment when the costs of unemployment are higher or the costs of infl ation are lower. What could give rise to these differences? One simple answer is the historical experience (which trains the mind to deal with such uncertainties) and the institutions designed by societies to deal with such shocks. For example, differences in the strength of informal insurance networks, or differences in the welfare state may affect the costs of falling unemployed. Or differences in mental training under high infl ation or historical experience with indexation institutions may affect the costs of infl ation. If humans design these institutions to deal with macroeconomic policy, then societies might benefi t from the joint design of monetary policy and (say) the welfare state and indexation laws.
Di provide evidence of a negative relationship between infl ation and the welfare state using a panel of 20 OECD countries over the period 1961-1992, controlling for country and time fi xed effects, country-specifi c time trends, other covariates, and using different measures of benefi t generosity (for example, the length of time over which unemployed people can claim benefi ts).
A recent paper by Becchetti, Castriota, and Giuntella (2007) studies employment protection legislation and the age structure of the population with the objective of separating countries with different well-being costs associated with macrofl uctuations. They fi nd that the relative cost of unemployment is higher in intermediate age cohorts and in low job pro-tection countries. They point out that this might explain the difference in objectives for the U.S. Federal Reserve (price stability and employment) versus the European Central Bank (price stability only) and their actual experiences with inflation.
Which Emotion Should a Central Bank Target?
Economists build their models of monetary policy around the concept of utility. Perhaps the role of this concept is instrumental (allowing research- ers to structure their thoughts) rather than descriptive. But two natural questions that arise are:
1. Is there an emotion that is in fact close to utility? 2. Is this the correct emotion to target?
On the first question, psychologists have described several positive emotions, including happiness and contentment. Two survey measures seem particularly relevant: the answers to the questions "Are you happy?" and to "Are you satisfied with your life?" The evidence that we presented in section 2 suggests that the former may better capture instantaneous mood whereas the latter has a larger intertemporal component. If we take the plausible position that contentment captures, to some degree, the future, then life satisfaction may be our best available proxy for an overall measure of welfare. Importantly there are large samples of people that have been asked about their satisfaction with life. Validation studies, in particular those involving smiles and fMri data as briefly discussed in section 1, suggest that they are indeed related to the economist's concept of utility, so the answer to the first question is yes. Before proceeding, we note that a separate question on which psychologists and economists do not agree is whether any of these two measures can in fact be considered a summary of other emotions, or if they are themselves a component of utility.
The second question is harder to answer. In brief, we believe that it is reasonable to target contentment (for example, as captured in the answer to a life satisfaction question). This is relatively uncontroversial for the implausible case that other emotions are constant. How can we oppose policies that will lead to the "good life"? The complication is that contentment can be quite stable while happiness may be going down in many realistic settings. It is likely that politicians who target contentment will be forced out of office by those that propose policies that raise happiness. The success of populist platforms is one indicator of their appeal.
A more serious problem is that many actors appear to be actively managing other emotions. One example is voters controlling their anger after observing a corrupt privatization (see Di Tella and MacCulloch 2009) . Another example, closer to the issues that concern central banks, involves asset bubbles. Indeed, investors often enter markets that have experienced large increases in prices, even when fundamentals do not appear to be changing (in a positive direction). For example, until very recently people kept on buying houses in the United States even though negative news kept coming in (about the existence of a war, the deterioration of the current account, and so on). One possible explanation is that investors in this market are also trying to minimize regret, as in Rotemberg (this volume). Thus, they enter the market after price increases because the likelihood of "missing out" on the boom and the cost of experiencing regret at the lost opportunity looms larger in their minds than the fear of losing money in the collapse of the bubble. One likely contributor to this asymmetry is the fact that when missing out on the opportunity, the misfortune is experienced in solitude (while the rest are happy). In contrast, when the bubble collapses, the misery is collectively experienced. One hesitates to add that inferences about one's own ability/identity are harsher in the first scenario than if one can convince oneself that the problems were so tough that even a large collection of people made the same mistake. A central bank focusing on contentment may leave interest rates unchanged while asset prices rise with the justification that contentment had not moved, making economists who worry about bubbles less impressed with contentment as a target for policy.
In summary, a question for future research is to discover which emotion is the most relevant one for economists, in terms of whether it affects market prices and whether it affects (or should affect) government policy choices.
Conclusion
We show that direct data on contentment, measured as self-reported overall satisfaction with life for over 600,000 Europeans, are negatively correlated with the unemployment rate and the inflation rate. There are several possible uses of this result. Our preferred interpretation is that it shows that an emotion that is close to utility is affected by macroeconomic fluctuations. This can be a powerful complement to studies restricted to looking at revealed preference. Even if one takes the view that contentment is just one of many emotions that need to be studied, it seems that it should also be possible to construct direct empirical measures of these other emotions.
We discuss two broad applications of our results. First they may help central banks understand the tradeoffs that the public is willing to accept in terms of unemployment for infl ation, at least in terms of keeping the average level of one particular emotion (contentment) constant. Of course we will need more work to make sure that we are identifying the causal effects of these variables on emotions, but we believe that the idea of central banks focusing their research efforts on direct measures of emotions as an outcome variable is justifi ed. An alternative application of these data is to study the channels through which macroeconomics affects emotions.
Economists might also see the results presented as an initial step at obtaining the weights in a social loss function that they can compare with those obtained in more traditional models that dominate the design of monetary policy (for instance, Eichenbaum 1992; Rotemberg and Woodford 1997). Some of the assumptions that have to be made for using our results in this context (a representative agent exists, a summary measure of emotions akin to utility exists, and that individuals only care about income and leisure) will not sound extreme to those trained in this area.
The approach we discuss has limitations, but we suspect that several of them arise because so few researchers with experience in macroeconomic policy have studied these data, and because so few resources have gone into perfecting the measures. For example, we still do not know if the contentment data that we have available for large samples of individuals refer to instantaneous utility or if it is an intertemporal measure (although several results appear similar when we use data on happiness-which is arguably closer to an instantaneous measure). The problem, however, does not seem insurmountable as it can be addressed by developing better measures of contentment. Krueger and Greg Mankiw, as well as conference participants, Rawi Abdelal, Sebastian Galiani, John Helliwell, Huw Pill, and Julio Rotemberg. We thank Jorge Albanesi for excellent research assistance. 345 
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Notes 1. One area where utility is a poor predictor of choice is moral decisions (see, for example, Greene et al. 2001) . Even more narrowly, one can distinguish between positive and negative affect when constructing measures of emotions (see, for example, Watson and Tellegen 1985; and Myers and Diener 1994) .
2. See Akerlof (2007) for a discussion of subjectivity and models with more realistic motivations in macroeconomics.
3. Mankiw (2001) outlines four other costs of infl ation. One, infl ation induces fi rms to incur more "menu costs." Two, because the tax laws are not indexed, infl ation raises the effective tax on capital income and thereby discourages capital accumulation and economic growth. Three, infl ation makes economic calculations more diffi cult because the currency is less reliable as a yardstick for measuring value. Four, because unexpected price changes redistribute real wealth between debtors and creditors, volatile infl ation creates risks that people seek to avoid and makes the use of long-term contracts using money as the unit of account less tenable (see 8-9). Fischer and Modigliani (1980) is a classic paper outlining the costs of infl ation.
4. See Atkeson and Phelan (1994) . A different approach to measuring the costs of business cycles using asset prices is developed in Alvarez and Jermann (2004) .
5. Note that such an exercise is of interest even if one believes that there is no tradeoff between infl ation and unemployment in the long run because shocks might still exist and there is the question of how draconian the adjustment path should be.
6. Broadly, on the one hand, prices change more often when infl ation increases, so forfeiting a purchase decision in favor of further searching is risky because prices might increase. On the other hand, the fact that there are relative price oscillations means that there are potentially more bargains out there, so additional search is more valuable. For a discussion of the role of markups, see Béna-bou and Gertner (1993) .
7. While the loss measures derived depend on several details (in particular the assumptions about the timing of the pricing decisions), the point remains that stabilizing the price level (and not just making expected infl ation equal to actual infl ation) eliminates the main source of the costs of infl ation, namely relative price distortions.
8. Economists have long been aware that their approach would be seen as slightly odd by other people: "we shall see that standard characterizations of the policymaker's objective function put more weight on the costs of infl ation than is suggested by our understanding of the effects of infl ation; in doing so, they probably refl ect political realities and the heavy political costs of high infl ation" (Blanchard and Fischer 1989, 567-568) .
9. In that case, one would expect that income inequality would have different effects across the United States and Europe, or across people with different ideological inclinations. See, for example, Alesina, Di Tella, and MacCulloch (2004) and Di Tella and MacCulloch (2005) .
10. Conceptually, happiness research need not rely on subjective data. For example, economists who want to focus on actions could study suicide rates or hypertension under the assumption that these phenomena are correlated with true internal happiness. See Stevenson and Wolfers (2006) and Blanchflower and Oswald (2007) for examples of work along these lines. For a register of happiness surveys across 112 nations, visit the World Data Base of Happiness: http:// www1.eur.nl/fsw/happiness/. For a discussion of happiness malleability, see Seligman (2004) .
11. In our own estimates of adaptation to income using the German panel we find adaptation to income over 3-4 years. The process of adaptation to income is stronger for left-wingers than for right-wingers (see Di Tella, Haisken-De New, and MacCulloch 2006).
12. There are also indicators of "perceived inflation" that give quite different answers to the official CPI measures. Conceptually we should be able to test whether it is actual inflation rates or perceived inflation rates that matter most to consumers using happiness data.
13. There is a potential problem when life satisfaction scores are at the top of a certain measurement scale, so that they cannot rise higher, or at the bottom of the scale, so that they cannot fall lower. This is more serious in surveys with few categorical answers (the Eurobarometer has four, whereas most new surveys offer a 10-point scale). These bounds can also make it appear that marginal utility is diminishing as consumption increases, when in fact the scores are hitting the top of the scale and for that reason becoming less responsive to rising true utility.
14. Svensson (2004) converts these estimates to a tradeoff between the output gap and inflation using Okun's Law. He states that "a simple version of Okun's Law is that a change of the unemployment rate of one percentage point corresponds to a change of the output gap of some 2 to 2.5 percentage points" (6). That is, Output Gap = − κ Unemployment where κ ∈ (2, 2.5) and both the output gap and unemployment are measured in percentage points. Consequently a one percentage point reduction in the output gap would cause between 0.4 (=1/2.5) and 1 (=2/2) times as much of a reduction in contentment as an additional percentage point of inflation.
15. Some question the desire to require the central bank to correct all macroeconomic distortions (even when they are aggregate in nature). As a justification, Galí (2002) invokes the principle of division of labor and suggests that "other branches of government are likely to have more suitable tools than those under the control of the central bank to handle many of those distortions. Hence, it would seem desirable to assign the central bank with the task of correcting the distortions of a monetary nature." He then assumes that the monetary authority's mandate is to correct the distortion associated with the presence of staggered price setting (see also Rotemberg and Woodford 1999; and Galí and Monacelli 2005) .
16. As an example to illustrate this problem, consider the hypothesis that infl ation only matters because it makes people think that they enjoy money more than they do. A one-shot increase in prices at time t leads to plans for excessive work hours in the future being made. However, at time t people would not tick down their happiness scores.
17. The question of whether well being measures can be compared across cultures can be studied using vignettes as anchors, as in King et al. (2003) . Helliwell and Huang (2006) use population shares above particular numerical life satisfaction cut-off scores as alternative dependent variables.
18. It is interesting to note that 36 percent of right-wing individuals declare being at the top life satisfaction category (compared with almost 22 percent of left-wing individuals). A second defi nition based on answers to the question-"If an election were to be held tomorrow, which party would you vote for?"-(and the subsequent classifi cation of these parties into "left" and "right" by political scientists) yields similar results.
19. Note that such a large drop seems inconsistent with the small difference between the lifetime expected utility of the employed and the unemployed in some models (for example, Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984) . 20. One can presumably reject the hypothesis that the answers to the happiness question are themselves just noise because they are strongly correlated with life satisfaction answers.
21. Note that one can still push the idea that this ambiguity does not affect the relative coeffi cients on infl ation and unemployment (or comparisons across subgroups of the population) under the assumption that changes in these macroeconomic variables elicit a reaction of similar aspects of life satisfaction, and provided that both infl ation and unemployment are governed by similar stochastic processes so that both coeffi cients in a life satisfaction regression are scaled up or down in the same proportion. However, there are many applications in macroeconomics that require more precision in the interpretation.
22. However, within the United States, the University of Michigan monthly consumer survey has recently included the question: "Now think about the past week and the feelings you've experienced. Please tell me if each of the following was true for you much of the time this past week: You were happy. You felt sad. You enjoyed life. You felt depressed." People are asked to give "yes-no" answers to each of those four questions.
23. An alternative position, which originated with Charles Darwin, views emotional expressions as signals in communication games.
24. Another potential application of well being data in the labor market concerns the gains from better matching (see Luechinger, Stutzer, and Winkelmann 2007) .
25. There were no episodes of deflation in the sample so there is no dummy variable defined to capture this state. However, conceptually we should be able to measure whether there are asymmetric costs to deflations versus inflations using contentment data. I think the evidence that psychologists have assembled suggests that global life satisfaction and happiness questions are easily manipulated by subtle changes in wording, changes in question order, and recent irrelevant events (Schwarz and Strack 1999) . I do not think that this limitation means that subjective evaluations should never be analyzed or that they are meaningless, but this limit should be borne in mind. All economic data have noise. Di Tella and MacCulloch raise the right question: is there a signal present in the subjective data? If so, perhaps the noise will average out. And I do agree that there is some signal in the self-reported satisfaction measures. For example, self-reported life satisfaction correlates with health, longevity, and brain functioning. So I do think that there is a signal found in satisfaction data, although I wonder sometimes about exactly what that signal is reflecting.
This leads to my second approach for commenting on the paper. Instead of giving a global evaluation of the paper as a whole, I can report how satisfied I am with different domains of the paper:
"From 0 to 10, how satisfied am I with the paper's importance, exposition, use of econometrics, interpretation, creativity; and how convincing is it?
I think there is no question that this paper addresses an important topic, so I give it a 10 on that dimension. On interpretation, I give the paper a 5 or 6, and that is where I will concentrate most of my comments. On exposition, I think some parts of the paper could have been more clearly explained, so I give it a 5. As for creativity, I think this paper takes a clever approach to the problem, and I give it a 9. The application of econometrics could have been improved, and I give my lowest score to that dimension, a 4. Lastly, like some survey respondents, I refuse to give an answer to how convincing the results are because I'm not sure.
As my remarks suggest, an alternative to learning how people view their lives is to ask them how satisfied they are with specific domains of their lives, instead of asking about their lives as a whole. That could be done either by asking about satisfaction with their home life, work life, social life, and so on, or by collecting data moment-by-moment on how people feel about what they are doing. These two approaches-an overall global evaluation versus more specific reporting-sometimes give different results (see Krueger et al. 2009 ).
What's more, I think the differences are not random. People use selection bias in recalling domains of their life when making an overall evaluation of their lives. In one study of school teachers, Kahneman et al. (2002) found that teachers in the poorest performing schools in Texas were fairly unhappy while they were at work compared with teachers in exemplary schools, but they were no less satisfied with their lives as a whole. While work satisfaction was notably lower for the teachers in the poor performing school, apparently the teachers working in these schools chose to ignore a consideration of their work lives when answering the overall life satisfaction question. One way of avoiding this type of selection bias is to ask respondents specifically about what they did with their time in some interval and how they feel about it, or to ask about their satisfaction with different domains of their life to get a more complete picture.
Another concern is that when people answer global life satisfaction questions, they tend to use rules of thumb to form their answers because a question about life satisfaction is not something, like their street address, that they are used to answering all the time. Nonetheless, people have no problem giving an answer to life satisfaction questions; the questions have low nonresponse rates. I suspect that many people arrive at an answer by going through an exercise in which they say, "I'm pretty welloff financially, I should be satisfied with my life" or "I just got divorced or lost my job, I should be unsatisfied." This is one reason, I suspect, why we find a stronger correlation between income and life satisfaction than we do between income and how people feel from moment-to-moment . This process has been described as a "good fortune heuristic." If people are fortunate in their financial circumstances, they may use that gauge as their rule of thumb for answering questions about life satisfaction.
There might also be something of "a good economic performance heuristic" to some extent. When people are asked about their satisfactionespecially in a survey where respondents are told that the purpose of the survey is to compare people all across the world or, in the Eurobarometer, where the point is to compare across European countries-they might think, "My country is doing pretty well, I should be satisfied." It is certainly possible that such a heuristic affects the underlying data in Di Tella and MacCulloch's paper.
I think another issue with interpretation is that there are many aspects that influence subjective well-being. There's a whole family of different measures that can be used to assess subjective well-being. The various measures reflect different factors. The correlation between moment-tomoment measures of mood and life satisfaction is certainly less than one.
I do not believe that any single measure of well-being is best. Any one is just a partial measure of well-being that is, at best, correlated with utility. Indeed, I think the paper would read much better, and be a better paper, if the authors had done a global "search and replace" on the term true utility and replaced it with subjective well-being. I don't think the results are any less significant for central banks if the results are just interpreted as reflecting determinants of some component of subjective well-being or one measure of subjective well-being. If it is true utility that the authors believe they are seeking to measure, I think they are raising the bar unnecessarily high.
Turning to the econometrics, where I gave a low score, I think there are strengths and weaknesses in the approach used by Di Tella and MacCulloch. One strength is that country fixed effects are included, which eliminates some possible cultural differences in satisfaction questions. Another strength is that the authors examined many different subsamples and included interactions for different groups.
The main econometric weakness concerns the level of analysis. There are not 600,000 independent observations. There are only 16 European countries or so over about 25 years in the sample.
1 Time-series data tend to move slowly over time, so I would not be surprised if the residuals are serially correlated at the country level. I would recommend proceeding in two steps-first removing individual characteristics and then aggregating to the country level to do the analysis and model some of the time-series properties of the errors. In addition, it would be instructive to present some scatter plots displaying the results across the countries.
I'm a little bit nervous that the results are more sensitive to small changes, such as changes in the sample coverage, because the precision of the estimates is overstated in the individual-level analysis that does not allow for serially correlated country errors. In a version of the paper that used a smaller sample, the ratio of alpha to beta was on the order of 4 to 1, indicating that unemployment is much more important for satisfaction than inflation. Now the ratio is much closer to 1 to 1. It would also be useful to have a standard error for the ratio of alpha to beta. And it would be helpful to explain why Blanchfl ower (2007) fi nds an even larger effect of unemployment than infl ation in his related analysis of life satisfaction data.
I also wonder if Di Tella and MacCulloch's models over-control for covariates by controlling for income and one's own employment situation. The latter feature of the specifi cation assures that the ratio of alpha to beta understates the impact of unemployment because the direct effect of unemployment on an unemployed individual's life satisfaction is held constant. Research has found that individuals who become unemployed, especially if they are laid off individually, as opposed to part of a mass layoff or plant closing, suffer a large and lasting drop in life satisfaction.
Another econometric concern is that the substantial differences in the results between the World Values surveys and the Eurobarometer data are not reconciled. I also worry a little about heterogeneity in responses. Maybe countries that have people who worry a lot more about infl ation tend to lower it more. And you can make the same kind of argument for unemployment.
In addition to the econometrics issues just mentioned, I have a to-do list for the authors. I think Di Tella and MacCulloch can do more to tease out why the unemployment rate matters. What I take away as the really stunning result in the paper is that the unemployment rate matters much more than real business cycle models say it should matter for people's welfare. Why? Can you distinguish between the regional unemployment rate and the national unemployment rate-is it what people read in the news media or what they see going on in their more immediate areas that matters more? Likewise, you can use the overall unemployment rate versus a rate that is more specifi c to an individual's skill set. Which matters more?
I also worry that a high infl ation rate is a marker for something else about a country, especially in the World Values Survey. The standard deviation in the infl ation rates across countries in the World Values Survey was 100 percent, which is remarkably high. Countries that have extremely high infl ation rates may be basket cases for lots of reasons, so infl ation is standing in for those other features of the country.
It would be useful to look for some corroborating evidence to bolster the paper's assertions. If unemployment matters so much for life satisfac-tion, why is infl ation but not unemployment included in the Fair model of voting? Which variable predicts elections better, infl ation or unemployment? This is one way of getting closer to looking at revealed preference.
The fi nding that infl ation has a smaller effect on satisfaction for higher income people than for lower income people is quite striking and surprising. That result suggests to me that tax bracket creep is not the explanation for why infl ation matters so much for satisfaction-because higher income people have more savings and should be more concerned that the return on their savings is eroded by infl ation.
To connect the paper's results to monetary policy, I thought it would be useful to examine the effects of the levers-interest rates-that a central bank has at its disposal to nudge infl ation and unemployment. What I have in mind is a reduced-form model. How does the federal funds rate, or its European equivalent, infl uence life satisfaction? Of course, one has to overcome endogeneity problems to provide a convincing answer, but ultimately this relationship is what the central bank should be interested in.
To conclude, I think the results in the paper help to explain why politicians are so concerned about unemployment, despite Robert Lucas's protestations. I view this paper as more of a contribution to positive economics than normative economics, even though it is using a normative outcome measure. I think central banks should be interested in understanding the political economy behind infl ation and unemployment; that is, why the unemployment rate matters so much for people. Di Tella and MacCulloch's results help to explain why Humphrey-Hawkins gives a dual mandate, and why there's popular support for it.
Regardless of the results, however, the Federal Reserve Board needs to respect its congressional mandate. The paper devotes much attention to discussing what the Fed should do in light of the heavy weight placed on unemployment in satisfaction regressions. That discussion strikes me as irrelevant. The Fed gets its mission from Congress, not from regression results.
A fi nal question pertains to why is this paper considered a contribution to the misnomer known as behavioral economics? If one defi nes behavioral economics as the integration of ideas from psychology into economics, I suppose the present paper qualifi es as behavioral econom-ics. But sociologists also helped develop and use life satisfaction data. So I do not find that a fully compelling explanation for classifying this as a contribution to behavioral economics.
Here is another justification. The use of self-reports of satisfaction becomes more attractive if there are problems in revealed preference; that is, if one cannot infer preferences from decisions. One of the central implications of behavioral economics is that one cannot always rely on revealed preference to infer preference orderings. People's decisions don't necessarily reflect what's in their own interest, and their decisions can be inconsistent depending on how choices are framed. In that case, our standard practice of relying on revealed preference is not all it is cracked up to be, and the appeal of alternative ways to decipher what people like, such as by asking them, is greater.
Finally, the results themselves lend some support to why behavioral economics is considered a worthy subfield. A major result of the paper is that the national unemployment rate has a profound effect on people's sense of their well-being beyond what would be expected from their personal consumption of goods and leisure. Yesterday George Baker argued that individuals' identities are connected to their jobs and work. I suspect that that is one reason why the experience of unemployment has a lasting effect on individuals, especially individual layoffs. And I suspect that unemployment has an effect on individuals' views of their country as well, a perspective that extends beyond their own immediate situations. Note 1. Because some of the sample covers a period after European Monetary Union, one can also argue that there is dependence in inflation rates across countries that use the euro, at lease for part of the sample. To be more precise, I can report that I am often happier after reading one of these papers than I was before reading it.
Some economists are congenitally skeptical about asking people how happy they are. But I am more open-minded about it. One reason is simple diminishing marginal utility from looking at yet another set of regressions on the conventional macroeconomic time series. Moreover, I find that a lot of the results produced by this happiness research ring true to me.
One finding from this literature is that living with adolescent children makes people less happy. When I first read of this result, my kids were small, and I was agnostic about it. Now, as the father of two teenagers, I am not about to argue. And neither would my wife.
Some of this research finds that happiness as a function of age is U-shaped: happiness reaches its nadir around middle age, and then rises as a person grows older. As someone about to celebrate the half-century mark, I find that result appealingly hopeful.
This new paper takes on the formidable task of asking what central bankers should learn from happiness research. The basic premise is that central bankers are told to care about inflation and unemployment, but are unsure how to weight those two goals. If we can measure how much inflation and unemployment affect happiness, then we can give central bankers the appropriate weights for their objective functions.
There are various assumptions that one has to accept to buy into this analysis. The first is that happiness is the right objective.
My initial reaction is to balk at this assumption. It is tempting for some economists to treat self-reported happiness as utility, which in turn enters the benevolent social planner's objective function. That assumption is appealing mainly because it is so convenient, but I am not fully convinced.
Like many parents, I try to impress upon my children that there is a vast difference between happiness and satisfaction, that a good life is more important than a happy one. This conversation usually takes place when I am trying to explain to my young son that it is time to turn off his Game Boy, and that I am telling him to do this not as a punishment but for his own good. Somehow, he never seems convinced.
I am not entirely sure what this happiness objective really means for central banking. But I do hope that as economists embark on happiness research, we don't forget that happiness and utility are not necessarily synonyms.
The bigger problem I have with this paper involves issues of identification. These concepts are not explored as fully as they need to be in order to make the analysis persuasive. So let's think a bit more about identification in this context.
One way to approach the question is to ask what is causing variation in the right-hand variables, inflation and unemployment, over time in various countries. There are many possible sources of this variation. First, there are labor-market policies, such as minimum-wage laws and unemployment-insurance programs. Second, there are shocks. The productivity slowdown of the 1970s was responsible for, or at least complicit in, the rising inflation and unemployment rates of that era, and the productivity acceleration of the 1990s was similarly a large part of the good news of that decade. Third, there is the general competence of a nation's policymaking institutions to consider, such as the ability of the nation's central bank to maintain independence and low inflation in the face of difficult shocks and political pressure.
With these sources of variation in mind, consider what must be true for the regressions in this paper to make sense as structural estimates. You have to believe that these exogenous disturbances affect happiness only 365 N. Gregory Mankiw to the extent that they affect inflation and unemployment. But the more one thinks about this assumption, the less appealing it seems.
Those who advocate labor-market policies such as minimum-wage laws or generous unemployment insurance, for example, think that by helping to create a more egalitarian society, the policies will have some direct beneficial effect on happiness. Conversely, those who advocate scaling back the welfare state think that they will break the culture of dependency and thereby increase overall happiness. Both advocacy groups would expect these policies to affect happiness directly, while incidentally being correlated with unemployment.
Similarly, shocks such as slowdowns and accelerations of productivity could also affect happiness directly. In the late 1990s, the stock market boom probably raised happiness, as everyone enjoyed opening their 401(k) statements. But because this boom also influenced inflation and unemployment, the direct impact on happiness would mistakenly show up as biased coefficients on the included variables.
Finally, inflation and unemployment are correlated with the general competence of policymaking institutions. There is no doubt that incompetent policy can lead to high inflation and high unemployment-history is littered with such examples. For the estimates in this paper to be valid, you have to believe that incompetent policy influences happiness only through the channels of inflation and unemployment. This is surely not the case. Policymakers have a multitude of ways of making people miserable.
In short, the regressions here suffer from the problem of omitted variables that are likely to be strongly correlated with the included variables. For analyses of optimal monetary policy, omitted variables are not necessarily a problem. Central banks can take, for example, labormarket policies as given when they set monetary policy. They do not need to worry about the omitted nonmonetary determinants of social welfare-as long as these omitted variables are additively separable in the social welfare function, they won't affect optimal monetary policy. But the problem of estimating the social welfare function from observed inflation and unemployment is far more difficult. For this problem, you can't get easily ignore the omitted variables, even if they are additively separable.
One approach to dealing with this problem would be to search for plausible instruments. There is a large literature that tries to estimate monetary policy shocks. A reasonable assumption might be that these monetary shocks affect welfare only to the extent that they affect inflation and unemployment. In this case, one could use these shocks as instrumental variables in this kind of exercise.
Until that study is carried out, central bankers will have to take the estimates in this paper with a grain of salt. These regressions establish some intriguing correlations, which invite reflection and storytelling. But we are far from having established a causal connection between macroeconomic conditions and people's overall happiness.
In closing, let me call attention to a passing remark in the paper that may have some direct implications for monetary policy. The authors mention that reported happiness can be manipulated. In particular, in one study, respondents who "accidentally" found a dime on the ground just before they filled out the survey reported being substantially happier than a control group who did not enjoy this "accidental" good fortune.
This finding sheds a new light on the classic metaphor, attributable (I believe) to Milton Friedman, of money being dropped out a helicopter. Maybe this story should be more than a dramatic thought experiment. If the job of a central bank is to make people happy, as this paper presumes, it seems like we have stumbled upon a way to do it. Perhaps someone in the Fed system should be preparing a memo for Ben Bernanke? 
